xvii
Introduction
minister, should be elected for life, the Florentines gave the
job to Piero Soderini, an honourable man but chronically
incapable of making any kind of bold decision. Machia-
velli’s diplomatic career was thus mostly taken up in
attempts to persuade surrounding and threatening states
to leave Florence alone and not to expect financial or mili-
tary help from her for their wars elsewhere; that is, as far
as there was a discernible, long-term policy it was one of
prevarication. Far from home, Machiavelli would fre-
quently receive contradictory orders after he had already
started negotiating. Arriving in foreign towns, he would
find that his expense allowance wasn’t sufficient to pay
couriers to take his messages back to Florence. Sometimes
he could barely afford to feed and clothe himself. Such was
the contempt of the more powerful monarchs that he was
often obliged to wait days or even weeks before being
granted an audience.
It is in the light of these frustrations that we have to
understand Machiavelli’s growing obsession, very much in
evidence in The Prince, with the formation of a citizen army.
Florence was weak partly because of its size but mostly
because it had no military forces of its own. It relied on
mercenary armies which were notorious for evaporating
when things got tough, before the gates of Pisa for example.
A p ower-base built on an efficient and patriotic civilian
army would give a diplomat like Machiavelli a little more
clout and respect when he negotiated. Or so he hoped.
In June of 1502, four years into the job, Machiavelli met
xviii