Lehal Library

the prince differences would never be allowed; they are only useful in peacetime when they make it easier to keep people under control. In times of war everyone can see how flawed the policy is. There’s no doubt that rulers achieve greatness by over- coming the obstacles and enemies they find in their path. So when destiny wants to make a ruler great, particularly a new ruler who, unlike a hereditary king, really needs to build up his reputation, it sends him enemies and prompts them to attack him. That way he has the chance to beat them and climb the ladder his enemies have put in front of him. Hence many people reckon that when the opportunity presents itself a smart ruler will shrewdly provoke hostility so that he can then increase his reputation by crushing it. Rulers, and especially those new to power, have found that men they initially doubted prove more loyal and useful than those they trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci ran Siena more with the men he had doubted than the others. But it’s hard to lay down firm rules here because things vary from case to case. I’ll just say this: that a ruler can very easily win over men who opposed him when he came to power, if they are not in a position to support themselves with their own resources. They’ll be forced to behave more loyally than others in that they know they have to work hard to offset the negative impression the ruler initially had of them. So a ruler can always get more out of such men than out of people who feel too safe in his service and don’t really make an effort. Since the discussion demands it, I wouldn’t like to leave out a reminder to any ruler who has taken a new state with inside help that he must think hard about why the local people who helped him did so. If they didn’t act out of natural friendship for the new ruler, but only because the previous government wasn’t giving them what they wanted, it will be extremely demanding and difficult to keep their support, because the new ruler won’t be able to give them what they