against two kinds of danger: one internal, coming from his
own people; the other external, coming from foreign powers.
To defend yourself against foreign powers you need a good
army and good allies. And if you have a good army you’ll
always have good allies, and when you’re secure against
foreign powers you’ll always be secure internally too, assum-
ing there wasn’t already a conspiracy under way. Then even
when a foreign power does move against you, if you’ve lived
and organized yourself as I’ve suggested, you only have to
keep your nerve and you’ll survive any and every attack, like
the Spartan ruler Nabis in the example I gave earlier.
To get back to the internal situation: when there is no threat
from outside, a ruler must take care that his subjects don’t
start conspiring against him. He can guard against this by
making sure he isn’t hated or despised and that people are
happy with him, all of which is very important, as I’ve
explained at length. In fact, one of the most powerful prevent-
ive measures against conspiracies is simply not being hated
by a majority of the people. People planning a conspiracy
must believe that killing the ruler will be popular; when they
realize that, on the contrary, it would be unpopular they
lose heart, because conspiracies are always beset with endless
difficulties. Experience shows that for every successful con-
spiracy there are any number of failures. A conspirator can’t
act alone and can look for accomplices only among people he
believes are unhappy with the situation. But as soon as he
reveals his intentions to someone else he’s giving that person
the chance to improve his position, since obviously there are
all kinds of advantages to be had from betraying a conspiracy.
When you reckon that the benefits of betrayal are assured,
while joining a conspiracy is a risky and extremely dangerous
business, the man will have to be a rare friend indeed, or a
very bitter enemy of the government, if he’s going to keep
faith.
To summarize: on the conspirator’s side all you have is