Auxiliaries, combined forces and
citizen armies
until now
Auxiliary armies – that is, when you ask a powerful ruler to
send military help to defend your town – are likewise useless.
In recent times we have the example of Pope Julius during his
Ferrara campaign: having seen what a sad lot his mercenaries
were in battle, he reached an agreement with Ferdinand, King
of Spain, to have his forces come to help. Auxiliaries may be
efficient and useful when it comes to achieving their own
ends, but they are almost always counterproductive for those
who invite them in, because if they lose, you lose too, and if
they win, you are at their mercy.
Although ancient history is full of pertinent examples, I’d
like to stick to this recent case of Pope Julius II, whose decision
to put himself entirely in a foreign army’s hands merely to
take Ferrara could hardly have been more rash. But he was
lucky and the unlikely outcome of the campaign spared him
the possible consequences of his mistake: when his Spanish
auxiliaries were beaten at Ravenna, the Swiss turned up and
against all expectations – the pope’s included – routed the
hitherto victorious French, so that Julius escaped being a
prisoner either to his enemies, who had fled, or to his auxil-
iaries, who weren’t the ones to win the day for him. The
Florentines, who had no armed forces at all, took 10,000
French auxiliaries to lay siege to Pisa, a decision that put them
in greater danger than any they had experienced in their whole
troubled history. To fight his neighbours, the emperor of