enormous prestige. Had he taken Pisa for them, you could
hardly deny that the Florentines would have been right to
hang on to him, because if he had gone over to the enemy,
they wouldn’t have had a chance; but keeping him would
have meant accepting him as their ruler.
Turning to the Venetians, we find they fought confidently
and successfully when they fought for themselves, at sea that
is, where both nobles and armed commoners showed great
courage. But when they began to fight on land, they left
these strengths behind and, like other Italian states, hired
mercenaries. In the early stages of their expansion on the
mainland they had so little territory and so much prestige
they hardly needed to worry about their mercenary com-
manders; but when they pushed deeper into the peninsula,
under the leadership of Carmagnola, they got a taste of the
trouble mercenaries bring. They’d seen what a fine com-
mander Carmagnola was and under his leadership they had
defeated the Duke of Milan, so they soon noticed when he
lost his enthusiasm for the war. They realized they couldn’t
win anything else with him, because that wasn’t what he
wanted, but they couldn’t fire him either for fear of losing
what they had previously won; at which point the only safe
thing to do was to kill him. Later they hired Bartolomeo da
Bergamo, Ruberto da San Severino, Niccolò Orsini, Count of
Pitigliano, and other such mercenary commanders who were
always more likely to lose than win, and in fact at the battle
of Vailà the Venetians eventually lost in a single day all the
gains they had so determinedly accumulated over the past
800 years. The fact is that mercenaries bring only slow, belated,
unconvincing victories, then sudden, bewildering defeats.
Since these examples all have to do with Italy, which has been
dominated by mercenaries for many years, I’d now like to get
a broader view of the problem, because if we can trace its
origin and developments it will be easier to find a solution.
What we must remember is that over recent centuries, as